May I Be Recused? The Tension Between Judicial Campaign Speech and Recusal After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White by Besser, Matthew D.
May I Be Recused? The Tension Between Judicial
Campaign Speech and Recusal After Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White
MAT-Ew D. BESSER*
This Note explores the tension between the free speech rights of judicial
candidates and the importance of due process and impartiality in the judicial
system.. Part II discusses the development of judicial campaign speech
restrictions. Part III discusses challenges to those restrictions, culminating in
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White. This Part also discusses the likely
effects of that decision. Part IV discusses recusal and its justifications. In Part V,
the author determines that a judge need not recuse herself solely as a result of
her exercise of the free speech rights recognized in Republican Party of
Minnesota. However, because the answer to this question is not entirely clear, in
Part VI, the author proposes a simple addition to the American Bar Association
Model Code ofJudicial Conduct in order to clarify this conclusion.
Two principles are in conflict and must, to the extent possible, be reconciled.
Candidates for public office should be free to express their views on all matters
of interest to the electorate. Judges should decide cases in accordance with law
rather than with any express or implied commitments that they may have made
to their campaign supporters or to others.'
I. INTRODUCTION
As is often inevitably the case, by resolving one debate, the Supreme Court
launched two others. In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White that a restriction on the speech of judicial candidates
contained in Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct-the "announce clause" 2-
violated the free speech rights of those judicial candidates. 3 By so doing, the
Court answered a decade-long debate about the constitutionality of similar
restrictions contained in the Codes of Judicial Conduct of various other states.
However, by the time this debate began-and perhaps the impetus for it-the
American Bar Association had amended its own Code of Judicial Conduct,
replacing its announce clause with what it believed to be a less restrictive
* J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2004 (expected). I wish to thank
James H. Cannon and Anne French for their guidance in the development of this note. I also
owe a debt of gratitude to Professor Edward P. Foley for his support and guidance throughout
my law school years. More importantly, however, I must recognize my parents-Howard and
Barbara-who showed me the path, but never forced me to go down it.
I Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224,227 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis
added).
2 See infra Part II.
3 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
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alternative.4 Unfortunately the Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota
did not tell us how this alternative restriction on judicial campaign speech-the
"commit clause" 5
-is any different than its predecessor.
A second and potentially more significant problem stemming from this
newfound freedom of speech for judicial candidates is what occurs when a judge
is confronted with a case involving issues about which she spoke during her
campaign. Might electoral pressures cause her to unconsciously favor her
previously-expressed views in a way that violates the due process rights of the
litigants? Does the prospect of such an outcome destroy the appearance of
impartiality of the court? If the response is yes to either of these questions, should
a judge be required to recuse herself?
The purpose of this Note is to shed light on the tension between the free
speech rights of judicial candidates and the importance of due process and
impartiality in the judicial system. This Note determines that a judge need not
recuse herself solely as a result of her exercise of the free speech rights recognized
in Republican Party of Minnesota and proposes a simple addition to the American
Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct in order to clarify this
conclusion. Part II discusses the history of restrictions upon judicial campaign
speech. Part III discusses recent challenges to canons restricting judicial campaign
speech contained in various states' Codes of Judicial Conduct, including the
challenge involved in Republican Party of Minnesota. This Part also discussed
how the Court's recent pronouncement might affect judicial campaign speech in
the future. Part IV discusses recusal and its justifications. Part V asks whether
recusal is required if legal issues come before a judge about which she announced
her views during her campaign and concludes it is not. Because, however, the
answer to the question proposed in Part V is not self-evident, Part VI concludes
with a proposal for a simple addition to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that
will provide guidance to judges in this situation.
II. HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH
By amending its constitution in 1812, Georgia became the first state to
provide for popular election of inferior judges.6 When Indiana entered the Union
four years later, its constitution required the election of associate judges for its
circuit court.7 In 1832, Mississippi became the first state to popularly elect all of
its judges.8 Currently, thirty-nine states hold some type of popular elections for
4 See infra Part III.B.
5 See infra Part I.
6 Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, Am.
Judicature Soc'y (last updated Feb. 1999), at http://ajs.org/js/berkson.pdf, at 1.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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their judges.9 That fact notwithstanding, "the combination of schemes used to
select judges is almost endless. Almost no two states are alike, and few employ
the same method for choosing judges at all levels of their judiciary."'10
Nearly all states have adopted standards of judicial election conduct-most
of them modeled closely after the Model Code of Judicial Conduct-that restrict
the campaign speech of candidates for judicial office and judges running for
reelection."1 These restrictions represent a policy choice by states that it is
necessary to place some limits on the speech of judicial candidates in order to
9 Am. Judicature Soc'y, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General
Jurisdiction Courts, http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelectionCharts.pdf, at 1. The eleven states
that hold no type of elections for their judges at any level are: Connecticut; Delaware; Hawaii;
Maine; Massachusetts; New Hampshire; New Jersey; Rhode Island; South Carolina; Vermont;
and Virginia. Id This Note does not seek to resolve the long-standing debate over whether
popular election is an appropriate method of judicial selection. Nevertheless, the author agrees
with those who suggest that merit appointment is a preferable method of selecting judges than
popular election. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-92 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(C)(2), cmt. (2000)
("[Merit selection of judges is a preferable manner in which to select the judiciary."); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates are Unconstitutional, 35 IND.
L. REv. 735, 735-36 (2002) (noting that because of a lack of voter information and political
pressure on judges, "the idea of judicial elections [is] problematic"); Am. Judicature Soc'y,
Merit Selection: The Best Way to Choose the Best Judges, http://ajs.org/js/ms.descrip.pdf
(noting that merit selection protects against the compromising effects of fundraising and
campaigning, searches out the most qualified candidates for the bench, and emphasizes
professional credentials not political connections). But cf Roy A. Schotland, Myth, Reality, Past
and Present, and Judicial Elections, 35 IND. L. REv. 659, 659-60 (2002) (noting that the
original impetus for judicial elections was to increase popular control of the judiciary, free it
from domination by the other branches of government, and to enhance the caliber of the bench);
Jan Witold Baran, Judicial Candidate Speech After Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 39
CT. REv. 12, 12 (2002) (noting that "[t]he people want to elect judges"); Chemerinsky, supra,
at 736 ("The vast majority of states have judicial elections because of a belief that judges as
government officials should be accountable to their constituents.").
Recently, Justice O'Connor penned a concurring opinion in Republican Party of
Minnesota in which she expressed concerns about judicial elections in general. 536 U.S. at 788
(O'Connor, J., concurring). She noted that judges who are subject to regular elections may be
distracted by fear of adverse political consequences in high profile cases. Id. Justice O'Connor
also articulated concerns regarding the pitfalls of judicial fundraising. Since contested judicial
elections require campaigning-which in turn requires fundraising-judges may feel "indebted
to certain parties or interest groups" contributing to the judge's campaign. Id. at 790.
Furthermore, even if they are able to refrain from favoring donors, "the mere possibility that
judges' decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributors is likely to
undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary." Id For a more extensive discussion of the
importance of the public confidence in judicial impartiality, see infra Part V.
10 Berkson, supra note 6, at 2.
11 See, e.g., Stephanie Cotilla & Amanda Suzanne Veal, Note, Judicial Balancing Act:
The Appearance of Impartiality and the First Amendment, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741, 742
(2002).
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preserve an "impartial judiciary, and to prevent the erosion of public confidence
in the judicial system."' 12 They are binding on judges and candidates for judge and
violations thereof may result in disciplinary action.13
In 1921, the American Bar Association appointed a committee, chaired by
Chief Justice William Howard Taft, to create model standards ofjudicial ethics. 14
The product of this committee was the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics (the
"1924 Canons"), which were adopted by most states. 15 Canon thirty governed
"Candidacy for Office" and provided in relevant part:
A candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others to make
for him, promises of conduct in office... ; he should not announce in advance his
conclusions of law on disputed issues ... and he should do nothing while a
candidate to create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office
with bias, partiality or improper discrimination. 16
Public reaction to the 1924 Canons was favorable 17 and they served as the ABA's
model standards ofjudicial conduct for nearly fifty years."i
In 1969, the ABA convened a committee-headed this time by California
Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor-to revise the 1924 Canons, resulting in
the modem rules of judicial ethics.' 9 Adopted in 1972, the new ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct (the "1972 Code") regulated the speech of judicial candidates
through Canon 7(B)(1)(c), which stated in relevant part that a judicial candidate:
"should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office [or] announce his views on
disputed legal or political issues ... .-'20 The latter prohibition will be referred to
as the "announce clause" and the former as the "pledges clause."
In 1990, the ABA amended the 1972 Code, resulting in the current ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the "1990 Code"). 21 The announce clause was
eliminated in the 1990 Code and replaced with the admonition that candidates for
judicial office shall not "make statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come
12 Id. at 744. See infra Part V for a discussion of the importance of judicial impartiality
and public confidence in the judiciary.
13 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Pmbl. (1990).
14 Cotilla & Veal, supra note 11, at 741.
15 See id. at 741-42; RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION 42 (1996).
16 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924).
17 See, eg, Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial
Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1064 (1996).
18 Cotilla & Veal, supra note 11, at 742.
19 E.g., id.
20 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(C) (1972) (emphasis added).
21 Eg, Cotilla & Veal, supra note 11, at 742.
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before the court."'22 This prohibition will be referred to as the "commit clause."
The ABA made the change because it believed that the announce clause "could
not be practically applied in its literal terms," and that the commit clause is less
restrictive of the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates and thus "more in
line with constitutional guarantees of free speech. '23
In response to the Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesot and other
challenges to the ethical restrictions on judicial campaign speech, in August 2003
the ABA once again amended its Model Code of Judicial Conduct.24 Among
other changes, the pledges and commit clauses were collapsed into one section,
which now states that "with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are
likely to come before the court... [judges and judicial candidates shall not] make
pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial
performance of the adjudicative duties of the office." 25
III. CHALLENGES TO THE CANONS ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH HAVE
CLEARED THE WAY FOR MORE EXTENSIVE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH
In the past decade, there has been a great deal of scholarly debate regarding
the propriety of restricting judicial campaign speech.26 Those who support
restrictions on judicial candidate speech do so on the grounds that such
restrictions are necessary in order to protect the due process rights of litigants and
ensure that judges appear impartial, thus preserving public faith in the courts.27
22 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990) (emphasis added). The
commentary to the commit clause states that no matter what a judicial candidate publicly says
on an issue, the candidate "should emphasize in any public statement the candidate's duty to
uphold the law regardless of his or her personal views." Canon 5A(3)(d) cmt.
23 LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 50 (1992). For a
more in depth analysis of the differences between the announce clause and the commit clause,
see infra Part If.B.
24 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mcjc/code rev hod.pdf; see also Report to the House of Delegates, Am. Bar Ass'n
Standing Comms. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Judicial Independence, and Fed. Judicial
Improvements, at 8 (on file with author).
25 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (2003). Other relevant August
2003 amendments to the Model Code will be discussed, infra Parts II.A.2 and IV.
26 This Note does not seek to resolve the debate, but instead points out its general
contours in order to provide background information for the reader.
27 See generally Shepard, supra note 17, at 1059 (arguing it is fundamental to any judicial
system that judges rule impartially and that the public have faith in the courts); Robert M.
O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings, 35 IND. L. REV. 701, 723
(2002) (arguing that fairness, impartiality and due process concerns are all implicated by the
manner in which judicial elections are regulated); Robert F. Bauer, Thoughts on the Democratic
Basis for Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech, 35 IND. L. REV. 747, 748-49 (2002)
(arguing that the function of the courts makes it critical that they are viewed as impartial). The
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This argument is premised on the notion that judicial candidates are qualitatively
different than candidates for executive or legislative office because the judge's
role is to interpret the law impartially, not to implement new policy or advocate
causes on behalf of a constituency. 28 Those who oppose restricting the speech of
judicial candidates argue that the restrictions violate the First Amendment rights
of judicial candidates. This argument is grounded in the fundamental precept that
"political speech is at the very core of what is constitutionally protected [by the
First Amendment]. '29 Accordingly, if states are going to require judges to act like
politicians by running for office, "then these individuals should have the same
basic right to free speech as all others standing for election." 30 Furthermore, the
argument goes, the vagueness of the prohibitions in the canons runs the risk of
chilling constitutionally protected political speech.31 Opponents of the restrictions
also argue that by limiting what judicial candidates may say, states impede the
ability of the electorate to appropriately choose judges.32
tension between a judicial candidate's free speech rights and a litigant's due process rights
coupled with the appearance of impartiality will be discussed, infra Part V.
28 Cf Brief in Support of Respondents for Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice at
New York University School of Law at 6-7, Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765
(2002) (No. 01-521) (arguing in support of the announce clause Minnesota's Code of Judicial
Conduct); Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n, 565 F.2d 295, 305 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting that states
may regulate judicial candidates differently than candidates for other political offices). In
Morial, the Fifth Circuit explained that the differences between judges and other elected
officials justify some special regulation ofjudicial campaign conduct:
[T]he contours of the judicial function make inappropriate the same kind of particularized
pledges of conduct in office that are the very stuff of campaigns for most non-judicial
offices. A candidate for the mayoralty can and often should announce his determination to
effect some program, to reach a particular result on some question of city policy, or to
advance the interests of a particular group. It is expected that his decisions in office may be
predetermined by campaign commitment. Not so the candidate for judicial office. He
cannot, consistent with the proper exercise of his judicial powers, bind himself to decide
particular cases in order to achieve a given programmatic result.
Morial, 565 F.2d at 305.
29 Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 735; see, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765, 781 (2002); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
222-23 (1989) (noting that debate regarding the electoral process is at the core of the First
Amendment); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (noting that a major purpose of
the First Amendment is to "protect the free discussion of governmental affairs, [including]
discussions of candidates").
30 Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 735.
31 See, e.g., id. at 740.
32 See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, "If Elected, I Promise _ -- What Should Judicial
Candidates Be Allowed to Say?, 35 IND. L. REv. 725, 725 (2002) (arguing that "[w]e cannot
give voters the job of picking judges and then deny them the kind of detail that a responsible
person would want to have to fulfill the assignment conscientiously").
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A. Recent Developments in the Law Regarding the Constitutionality of
Restrictions on Judicial Campaign Speech Have Generally Favored the
Free Speech Rights of Judicial Candidates
This Part will detail the main cases examining challenges to various
announce clauses up to and including Republican Party of Minnesota. Although
the precise bounds of permissible judicial candidate speech remain unclear, this
Part will attempt to shed light on the effects of these challenges-specifically
Republican Party of Minnesota-on judicial campaign speech.
1. Challenges to Various Announce Clauses Prior to Republican Party of
Minnesota
Until recently, the validity of canons of judicial conduct restricting judicial
campaign speech went largely unchallenged.33 Then, in 1990, on behalf of a
candidate for judicial office in Citrus County, Florida, the American Civil
Liberties Union sued to enjoin the enforcement of the announce clause in
Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct, claiming that the clause violated the First
Amendment.34 The candidate, who filed the suit anonymously, wished to criticize
the incumbent judge, which he felt would necessarily entail him "announcing his
views on disputed legal and political issues"--a practice prohibited by Florida's
announce clause.35
A Federal District Court sitting in the Northern District of Florida held that,
while a state need not treat judicial candidates exactly the same as candidates for
other elected offices, "a person does not surrender his constitutional right to
freedom of speech when he becomes a candidate for judicial office." 36 The
court-without providing the reasoning for doing so-then applied the test of
strict scrutiny to the announce clause.37 Although, according to the court,
protecting the integrity of the judiciary was a compelling state interest, the
announce clause's prohibition of all discussion of disputed legal and political
33 See O'Neil, supra note 27, at 701.
34 ACLU v. Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990). Florida's Code of Judicial
Conduct contained a prohibition identical to the announce clause in Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of the
1972 ABA Code. Id.
35 Id. at 1096.
36 Id. at 1097.
37 Id. at 1097-98. The announce clause, the commit clause, and likely any other canon
regarding judicial campaign speech, restrict speech on the basis of content and furthermore are
restrictions on core political speech. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Thus, the proper
test to measure their validity is strict scrutiny. E.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002) (noting that since the announce clause prohibits speech on the basis of
content and burdens core political speech, the appropriate test to determine its constitutionality
is strict scrutiny).
12032003]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
issues was not the most narrowly tailored way to achieve that goal. 38 The court
noted that the announce clause gagged "announcements on almost every issue
that might be of interest to the public and the candidates in a judicial race. 39
Thus, because Florida's announce clause could not pass strict scrutiny, the court
held that the clause violated the First Amendment and enjoined its enforcement.
In 1991, two more courts struck down the announce clauses in their
respective state Codes of Judicial Conduct. In Beshear v. Butt, the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas enjoined the enforcement of Arkansas'
announce clause against a judicial candidate who promised voters that he would
not allow plea bargaining if elected. 40 In .CJ.D. v. R.JCR., the Kentucky
Supreme Court, also on First Amendment grounds, refused to enforce Kentucky's
announce clause against a judge recently elected to that court.41 The judge in that
case challenged disciplinary action taken against him as a result of a Disciplinary
Committee finding that his conduct during the campaign resulted in seven
separate violations of Kentucky's Code of Judicial Conduct. One of the
allegations was that the judge violated Kentucky's announce clause by criticizing
the "fireman's rule," laws against felons carrying handguns, and the standard of
review for workers' compensation cases.42 In holding that the announce clause
violated the First Amendment, the court stated, "' [t]he candidate, no less than any
other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public
issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election.' 43 Without
38 ACLU 744 F. Supp. at 1098.
39 Id.
40 773 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
41 803 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1991).
42 Id. at 953-54
43 Id. at 954-55 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52 (1976)). This argument,
however, seems to neglect the intrinsic differences between elected judges and other types of
elected officials. For instance, the Fifth Circuit has noted the judicial fimction makes it
inappropriate for judges to make the types of specific promises of conduct during a campaign
that we would expect other elected officials to make. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n., 565 F.2d
295, 305 (5th Cir. 1977). Others have stressed the difference between judges and non-judicial
politicians. As Justice Stevens recently pointed out:
There is a critical difference between the work of the judge and the work of other public
officials. In a democracy, issues of policy are properly decided by majority vote; it is the
business of legislators and executives to be popular. But in litigation, issues of law or fact
should not be determined by popular vote; it is the business of judges to be indifferent to
unpopularity.
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that "[l]egislative and executive officials act on
behalf of the voters who placed them in office" whereas judges serve no constituency, and
arguing that for First Amendment purposes, judicial elections should be treated differently than
other elections); cf Bauer, supra note 27, at 749-50 (noting that judges are isolated from
contact with the public in a way that most elected officials are not and arguing that forcing
1204 [Vol. 64:1197
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explaining why, the court also noted, "[w]e further believe candidates for judicial
office can announce their views on legal and political issues without jeopardizing
the integrity and independence of the legal system or undermining the impartiality
of the judiciary." 44
Not all challenges to the announce clause have been successful. In Stretton v.
Disciplinary Board, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
upheld Pennsylvania's announce clause in the face of a- First Amendment
challenge from a judicial candidate.45 In that case, a lawyer running for trial judge
sought to enjoin enforcement of the announce clause, claiming that it impeded his
ability to announce his view that the court needed "activist" judges willing to look
at social changes when ruling on challenges to existing law.46 Denying an
injunction, the Third Circuit found a compelling state interest in preserving the
"integrity of the judiciary" and that the announce clause was narrowly tailored to
serve that interest.47 The court-unlike previous courts analyzing challenges to
various states' announce clauses-found that the needs of the judicial system
outweighed the First Amendment rights of the candidate, stating that "[t]aking a
position in advance of litigation would inhibit the judge's ability to consider the
matter impartially."48
In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined
to adopt the reasoning of the Third Circuit in Stretton when a candidate for
Illinois Supreme Court Justice challenged Illinois' announce clause. In Buckley v.
Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, the candidate circulated campaign literature
stating that he had "never written an opinion reversing a rape conviction." 49 As a
judges to campaign for election improperly obliterates the distinction between judges and other
elected officials); O'Neil, supra note 27, at 716 (noting that judicial candidates are uniquely
restrained regarding campaign fundraising in a way that other elected officials are not). Thus,
while it must be conceded that judicial candidates have a First Amendment right to advocate
their own election, a court analyzing the validity of any restrictions on judicial campaign speech
or activity should not lose sight of the fact that there are fundamental differences between
judges and other elected officials.
44 J.C.JD., 803 S.W.2d at 956.
41 944F.2d 137 (3rd Cir. 1991).
46 Id. at 139. The candidate also wanted to discuss: criminal sentencing and victims rights;
how he would apply the "reasonable doubt" standard; the need to more closely scrutinize the
work of trial court judges; the need for changes in the system ofjury selection in order to more
accurately reflect the county's racial composition; increased hiring of minorities in the judicial
system; his qualifications; and the importance of the right to privacy under the constitution. Id.
47 Id. at 142.
48 Id. at 144. The court noted that even if the judge rendered the correct decision in a
given case, by taking a position before litigation would give the public the impression that the
case was not properly adjudged. Id.
49 997 F.2d 224, 226 (7th Cir. 1993). The case was actually a consolidated appeal with
another judicial candidate who claimed that the fear of sanction deterred him from speaking out
on campaign issues he believed to be important to the voters such as capital punishment,
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result, the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board filed charges against him; yet even
though the Illinois Courts Commission found he violated the announce clause, no
sanction was handed down. 50 Upon challenge to the announce clause by the
candidate, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that the debate over the
constitutionality of the announce clause essentially revolves around two
competing principles: First, candidates for public office should be able to engage
in core political speech and second, judges should decide cases impartially rather
than with any prior commitments to the public in mind. 51 Pragmatically, the court
explained, "only a fanatic would suppose that one of the principles should give
way completely to the other."52 Unlike the Third Circuit in Stretton, however, the
court sided with the free speech rights of judges, holding that the announce clause
unconstitutionally "gags the judicial candidate. He can say nothing in public
about his judicial philosophy; he cannot, for example, pledge himself to be a strict
constructionist, or for that matter a legal realist."'53 According to the court, such a
prohibition was not narrowly tailored to serve any compelling state interest
because it "reaches far beyond speech that could reasonably be interpreted as
committing the candidate in a way that would compromise his impartiality should
he be successful in the election." 54
2. The Challenge to Minnesota's Announce Clause in Republican Party of
Minnesota
Although a majority of the recent First Amendment challenges to various
states' announce clauses have been successful in both federal and state courts, it
was not until 2002 that the Supreme Court finally rang the death knell for the
announce clause. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Court held that
abortion, the state's budget, and public school education. Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 227.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 228. The court went on to note the seemingly limitless scope of legal topics that
that various advisory bodies on legal ethics have suggested are off limits for discussion under
the announce clause. For example, a judicial candidate might violate her state's announce
clause by discussing her views on any of the following:
pretrial release, plea bargaining, criminal sentencing, capital punishment, abortion, gun
control, the equal rights amendment, drug laws, gambling laws, liquor licensing, dram
shop legislation, labor laws, property tax exemptions, the regulation of condominiums,
court rules, prior court decisions (both of other courts and of the candidate's court),
specific legal questions, and hypothetical legal questions.
Id. at 230 (citing PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 86-87 (1990)).
54 Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228.
1206 [Vol. 64:1197
M YIBE RECUSED?
Minnesota's announce clause violated the First Amendment.55
In 1996, Gregory Wersal ran for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme
Court and while doing so distributed literature critical of several of that court's
decisions on crime, welfare, and abortion.56 When a complaint was filed with the
Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility regarding the literature, Wersal
withdrew from the race, fearing that further ethical complaints would jeopardize
his ability to practice law.57 Wersal ran again for the Minnesota Supreme Court in
1998, this time filing suit in federal court seeking a declaration that Minnesota's
announce clause violated his First Amendment rights.58
Like its counterpart in the 1972 Code, Minnesota's announce clause stated
that a candidate for judicial office shall not "announce his or her views on
disputed legal or political issues."59 The Court explained that such a prohibition is
broader than a prohibition on promising to decide an issue a particular way-as is
prohibited in the ABA's pledges clause-but rather "extends to the candidate's
mere statement of his current position, even if he does not bind himself to
maintain that position after [the] election."60 Because this restriction is imposed
on the basis of content, the Court held that it must withstand strict scrutiny to be
valid under the First Amendment, 61 a test the Court held the announce clause did
not meet.62 One particular reason why the Court held the clause unconstitutional
55 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
56 Id. at 768.
57 Id. at 768-69. Wersal withdrew even though the Minnesota Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board had already dismissed the complaint against him. Id.
58 Id. at 769-70.
59 MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2002).
60 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 770. Perhaps this is the difference between the announce
clause and the commit clause. Presumably, the commit clause is violated when a judicial
candidate does bind herself or appears to bind herself to maintain her current position. The
Court did not seek to resolve the difference, stating "[w]e do not know whether the announce
clause (as interpreted by state authorities) and the 1990 ABA [commitments] canon are one and
the same. No aspect of our constitutional analysis turns on this question." Id. at 773 n.5.
Regardless of any distinction between the two, in 1994 Minnesota's Supreme Court declined to
replace the announce clause with the commit clause. The differences between the announce and
commit clauses will be discussed, infra Part III.B.
61 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 774-75.
62 Id. at 775-84. The Court recognized two asserted interests to justify the announce
clause: preserving the impartiality of the judiciary and preserving the appearance of impartiality
of the judiciary. Id. at 775. Although these interests seem clear enough as argued by
Respondent Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards-the first protects the due process rights of
litigants and the second, public confidence in the judiciary-writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
nonetheless questioned the precise meaning of "impartiality." Id. He rejected the notion that the
announce clause was narrowly tailored to serve impartiality if the term is defined to prohibit
bias in favor of or against a particular party because the clause regulates announcing views on
issues, not parties. Id. at 775-76. Justice Scalia also stated that the announce clause would not
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was that the clause was "woefully underinclusive, prohibiting announcements by
judges (and would-be judges) only at certain times and in certain forms."63
Striking down Minnesota's announce clause-and in effect any announce clause
contained in other state Codes of Judicial Conduct 64-the Court held .'[t]he
greater power to dispense with elections altogether does not include the lesser
power to conduct elections under conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance." 65
pass strict scrutiny if impartiality were defined to preclude judges from having preconceptions
about the law, noting, "[a] judge's lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a
case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice [in part because] it is
virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the law." Id. at
777; see infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. Finally, Justice Scalia dismissed a
definition of impartiality as meaning open-mindedness, stating the Court did not believe such a
meaning was what the announce clause encompassed. Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 778-79.
In response to the Court's analysis of "impartiality," the ABA, in its August 2003
amendments to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct included a definition of the term.
"Impartiality" is now defined by the Model Code as "absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or
against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an open mind in
considering issues that may come before the judge." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Terminology (2003). The definition tracks the Court's analysis by explicitly framing
"impartiality" in terms of bias towards parties and open-mindedness on issues, thus attempting
to ensure that the concept of judicial impartiality could be used during a strict scrutiny analysis
to protect any clauses in the Model Code in which the term is used. See Report to the House of
Delegates, supra note 24, at 10.
63 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 783. The Court explained the announce clause's
underinclusiveness as follows: a judicial candidate may not say "'I think it is constitutional for
the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.' He may say the very same thing, however, up
until the very day before he declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until
litigation is pending) after he is elected." Id. at 779-80. Thus, the announce clause prohibits
speech that is potentially harmful to judicial impartiality only at certain times, while leaving that
same speech unregulated if it occurs at other times, even if it is equally harmful.
64 At the time of the Republican Party of Minnesota case, seven states had prohibitions
substantially similar to the 1972 ABA announce clause: Arizona; Iowa; Maryland; Minnesota;
Mississippi; Missouri; and Pennsylvania. See ARIZ. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5B(l)(d)(iv) (2001); IOWA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (2001); MD. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B(5) (2001); MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
5A(3)(d)(i) (2001); Miss. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(l)(c) (2001); Mo. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B(lXc) (2001); PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(l)(c)
(2001). As of the June 2003, only Mississippi and Pennsylvania had responded to the Court's
decision in Republican Party of Minnesota by deleting the announce clause from their
respective Codes of Judicial Conduct and replacing them with the commit clause. See MISS.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3Xa)(ii) (2002); PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 7B(1)(c) (2001 & Supp. 2003). Likewise, the Supreme Court of Missouri issued an
order that its announce clause would not be enforced. See Order, Re: Enforcement of Rule 2.03,
Canon 5B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (July 18, 2002), available at http://www.osca.state.mo.us
sup/index.nsf. The other states-Arizona, Iowa, and Maryland-which have yet to follow suit
need to do so in the near future in accordance with the Court's decision.
65 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991)
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Four Justices dissented. Justice Stevens wrote a dissent in which Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. He explained that a candidate who
announces his views during a campaign is effectively telling the electorate: "Vote
for me because I believe X, and I will judge cases accordingly. '66 According to
Justice Stevens, the state has a compelling interest in sanctioning such
statements.67 Justice Ginsburg wrote the other dissent, which was joined by the
other three dissenting Justices. She explained that allowing judges to make
promises to the electorate runs the risk of violating the due process rights of
litigants and since the announce clause helps prevent against this danger by
preventing implied promises, it should be upheld.68
B. What Can Judicial Candidates Say During a Campaign After
Republican Party of Minnesota?
In 1990, the ABA amended its Code of Judicial Conduct, replacing the
announce clause with what it believed to be a narrower constraint on the free
speech rights of judicial candidates: the commit clause. 69 The change resulted
from the ABA's belief that the announce clause may not have been "in line" with
the First Amendment and was too difficult to apply in its literal terms.70
According to five Justices in Republican Party of Minnesota, the ABA was right
to be concerned about the constitutionality of the announce clause. Whether the
commit clause is more practical than its predecessor-or even constitutional-
remains to be seen.
For the time being-at least until courts say otherwise or the ABA does away
with it-the commit clause appears to be a constitutional replacement for the
announce clause. It is not at all clear, however, how courts should apply the
commit clause or how it differs in practice from the announce clause. The Court
in Republican Party of Minnesota noted the existence of the commit clause, but
because its constitutionality was not at issue, declined to analyze it or distinguish
it from the announce clause. 71 Although it is true that resolution of the case did
not require an analysis of the commit clause, the Court's treatment of it
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
66 Id. at 800 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 813-21 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). These due process concerns will be discussed,
infra Part V.A.
69 MILORD, supra note 23, at 50 (explaining that the commit clause "replaces the broad
prohibition against a candidate's announcing the candidate's views on disputed legal or political
issues with the narrower one against making statements that appear improperly to commit the
candidate with respect to matters likely to come before the candidate's court").
70 Id.
71 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 773 n.5.
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nevertheless was unfortunately "'not a model of clarity.' ' 72
One possible hint of the difference between the commit clause and the
announce clause that can be gleaned from the decision comes from the majority's
statement that the announce clause prohibited candidates from stating their
current position on an issue even if they did not bind themselves to retain that
position once elected.73 A logical understanding of the commit clause, on the
other hand, would not seem to extend to statements regarding a current position
on an issue, but rather only to statements in which the candidate binds herself or
appears to bind herself to maintain that position once elected. Whatever the
distinction between the two clauses may be, as emerging case law demonstrates,
courts have not yet provided clarity as to the precise scope of the commit clause.
1. Case Law Interpreting Various States' Commit Clauses Will Likely
Cause Confusion Regarding Its Proper Scope
In 1991, Jed Deters, a candidate for judge in Kenton County, Kentucky
placed ads in two newspapers, which stated in bold print, "Jed Deters is a Pro-
Life Candidate. '74 For placing the ads, Kentucky's Judicial Retirement and
Removal Commission found him in violation of Kentucky's commit clause and
ordered a public censure.75 Deters challenged the censure on several grounds, in
particular claiming that the commit clause violated his free speech rights. 76
Rejecting his First Amendment challenge, the Kentucky supreme court held that
the commit clause is narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state interest of
preserving the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal system. 77
Although the court upheld the commit clause, its application to the
candidate's statement in Deters is perplexing. According to the court, Deters's
statement that he is a "Pro-Life Candidate" violated the commit clause because he
72 Roy A. Schotland, Should Judges be More Like Politicians?, 39 COURT REVIEW 8, 8
(2002) [hereinafter, Schotland, Politicians] (quoting memo from Nat'l Center for State Courts,
Ad Hoc Comm. on Judicial Election Law (July 12, 2002) (analyzing Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White)).
73 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 770. Contra Lloyd B. Snyder, The Constitutionality and
Consequences of Restrictions on Campaign Speech by Candidates for Judicial Office, 35
UCLA L. REv. 207, 228 (1987) (stating that announcing one's views on an issue indicates that
the candidate hasfixed views on the issue).
74 Deters v. Jud. Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 201 (Ky. 1994).
75 Id. This was not the first complaint against Deters. Earlier in the campaign Deters
accepted a public reprimand from the Commission stemming from a complaint that he had
identified himself as a member of a particular political party in violation of Canon 7A(2) of
Kentucky's Code of Judicial Conduct. Id.
76 Id. at 203.
77 Id. at 204-05 (citing Ackerson v. Ky. Jud. Ret. & Removal Comm'n., 776 F. Supp.
309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991)).
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"publicly announced his view on the abortion issue for the admitted purpose of
obtaining support from voters interested in that issue."'78 While it specifically
stated his position on abortion, his expression of that position to the voters was
rather general. Regardless of whether one thinks judicial candidates should seek
votes by stating their positions on such a hotly-contested issue, Deters's
advertisement did not explicitly bind him to maintain his position if elected, and
even if it implicitly bound him to remain "Pro-Life," it did not bind him to resolve
any particular cases involving a related issue one way or another.
Under the Kentucky supreme court's analysis, however, the judicial
candidate's mere announcement of a position on an issue equates to a violation of
the commit clause. Such an interpretation is at odds with the purpose of the
commit clause to be less restrictive of the First Amendment rights of judicial
candidates than the announce clause, while still upholding the appearance of
impartiality in the courts.79 Indeed, if the Kentucky supreme court's analysis were
correct, there would be no difference between the two clauses and thus the
commit clause would likely be unconstitutional for the same reasons that doomed
the announce clause in Republican Party of Minnesota.80
In two recent cases, the Indiana supreme court interpreted its commit clause
to apply to statements that would have been more appropriately punished under
Indiana's pledges clause. In 2001, Indiana trial court judge Fredrick R. Spencer
accepted a public reprimand from the Indiana supreme court because of a
television commercial he ran during his reelection campaign. 81 The commercial
listed various types of crimes for which he promised during his initial election
campaign that he would imprison offenders, along with a picture of a cell door
slamming shut after each enumerated crime. 82 The commercial then stated that
Judge Spencer had kept his promise and suggested that he should be reelected.83
Four years earlier, William D. Haan, a candidate for trial judge, was publicly
reprimanded by the same court for distributing campaign materials in which he
pledged to "stop suspending sentences" and to "stop putting criminals on
probation" if elected.84
According to the Indiana supreme court, Spencer's commercial violated both
78 Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 202 (emphasis added).
79 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
80 Of course since the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of the
commit clause, we do not know whether it would ultimately withstand a First Amendment
challenge at that level.
81 In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064 (id. 2001).
82 Id. at 1065. The commercial, which ran approximately 128 times during the campaign
had the following narration: "When Judge Spencer ran for judge of the Circuit Court, he
promised to send more child molesters to jail ... burglars to jail... drug dealers to jail ... ." Id.
83 Id.
84 In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ind. 1997).
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Indiana's pledges and commit clauses.85 His commercial made no explicit
pledges of conduct nor did it bind him to maintain his advertised position on
harsh treatment of criminals. In fact, the commercial made no reference to future
conduct at all, but rather asked support for reelection because of what Judge
Spencer had done in the past. 86 Perhaps implicit in the commercial, however, is
the idea that Spencer's past performance establishes a pattern that voters could
expect him to follow in the future, thus resulting in a violation of the pledges
clause because the advertisement is one in which he implicitly promises to
continue harsh sentencing of convicted criminals. Haan's literature was punished
only under Indiana's commit clause.87 His statements were more explicit than
Spencer's, but because of that fact they could have easily been punished under the
pledges clause. Likewise with Spencer's commercial, the pledges clause seems to
be more easily applicable.
By reprimanding Spencer for violations of both clauses, and by reprimanding
Haan only for violating the commit clause, the Indiana supreme court blurred
rather than clarified the distinction between the pledges clause and the commit
clause, an interpretation that would render one of the two unnecessary.88 If courts
are going to punish pledges of conduct under the commit clause, then there is no
reason for the pledges clause. Yet when the ABA amended its Code of Judicial
Conduct in 1990, it did not eliminate the pledges clause nor did it suggest in any
way that the commit clause was meant to supercede the pledges clause. 89
Moreover, because the pledges and commit clauses now coexist in one
prohibition after the August 2003 amendments, it is clear that the purpose of the
commit clause is to be a separate restriction on judicial candidates.90 However,
when a judicial candidate considers the interpretations of the commit clause by
the supreme courts of Indiana and Kentucky 9 1-and the current silence from the
Supreme Court-the candidate has no way of knowing exactly what statements
might constitute an improper commitment that could result in discipline.
85 In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d at 1065.
86 Id.
87 In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d at 741.
88 Compare In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2001) (reprimanding Spencer for
violations of both clauses), with In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. 1997) (reprimanding Haan
for a violation of only the commit clause).
89 See Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 5A(3)(d)(i) (1990).
90 See Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(10) (2003).
91 In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2001); Deters v. Jud. Ret. & Removal Comm'n
873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1994).
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2. Uncertainty Regarding the Scope of the Commit Clause Will Have a
Chilling Effect on Judicial Campaign Speech But Will Not Chill All Such
Speech
Confusion regarding the reach of the canons regulating judicial campaign
speech has chilled and will continue to chill judicial candidates from engaging in
campaign speech,92 which is at the core of the First Amendment. Unfortunately,
this confusion and the resulting suppression of speech form a vicious cycle
because the chilling effect results in fewer opportunities for courts to clarify the
canons through interpretation, which in turn deters candidates from speaking. It
has been suggested that, "[t]he reason why there are so few enforcement cases
under the announce clause [and its replacement, the commit clause] is the in
terrorem effect of broad or ambiguous interpretations. Candidates... succumb to
the 'rule of silence' rather than risk complaints and the resulting damage to their
careers." 93 Given that judicial candidates have a constitutional right to discuss
political and legal issues and the chilling effect caused by confusion regarding
exactly what speech might subject a judicial candidate to discipline, state supreme
courts will need to try to interpret the commit clause more clearly or else it may
encounter the same fate that met its predecessor.94
The chilling effect, however, may not be as significant as it would seem to be
at first glance. Although one explanation for the relative lack of cases interpreting
the commit clause-and previously the announce clause-is their chilling effect
on speech, another is that they have not been consistently enforced. Justice
Stevens, in his dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota, noted that at the time
the case arrived at the Court, no judicial candidate, including Wersal himself, had
ever been sanctioned for violating Minnesota's announce clause. 95 Indeed, there
92 See Baran, supra note 9, at 12; Cf Shepard, supra note 17, at 1059-60 (stating that
continual challenges to the constitutionality of the canons causes this confusion among judges
as to what is appropriate behavior).
A national survey of 2,500 state court judges, taken shortly before the Court's decision in
Republican Party of Minnesota, discovered that eighty-nine percent of judges who had been
criticized during a campaign said that they "held back or felt restrained" from responding, with
seventy-three percent stating the cause of that restraint was their state's respective Codes of
Judicial Conduct. David B. Rottman, The White Decision in the Court of Opinion: Views of
Judges and the General Public, 39 COURT REVIEW 16, 18 (2002). Nonetheless, sixty-four
percent of judges surveyed felt that the existing canons represent an appropriate restriction of
judicial campaign speech, with only thirty percent saying the restrictions on speech are too
harsh. Id.
93 Baran, supranote 9, at 12 n4.
94 Cf id. at 13-14 (noting that it will be a "daunting task" to provide candidates with
sufficient clarity regarding Canon 5 while balancing the free speech rights of judicial
candidates).
95 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 799 n.2 (2002) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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do not seem to be any cases in any state over the past decade in which a judicial
candidate was found in violation of the announce clause and in which the clause
was not eventually ruled unconstitutional. 96 It is true that this may be attributed to
the chilling effect of the canons-there is no way to know for sure. However, for
a judicial candidate who is entrenched in a hotly-contested election, the chilling
effect might be melted away by the desire for election. In such an election, a
judicial candidate determined to win might very well look at the number of
successful challenges to the announce clause during the 1990s and decide that on
balance, the benefits from stating her views to her chances of success in the
campaign outweigh the risk of facing discipline for those statements; and even if
charges are brought, the candidate may be able to successfully challenge the
constitutionality of applying her state's commit clause to her, although it would of
course be costly and time-consuming to do so.
Given the nature of the electoral process, it seems safe to assume-now that
the announce clause is a dead letter-that judicial candidates are going to make
statements announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues,97 which
would previously have been prohibited by their state's respective Codes of
Judicial Conduct, but are now permissible. 98 Once these statements have been
made and help result in election, eventually the judge may be called upon to hear
a case involving an issue on which she announced her views during the campaign.
As Justice Ginsburg has pointed out, in such a case, there exists the possibility of
a threat to both a litigant's due process right to have an impartial judge and to the
appearance of an impartial judiciary. 99 There are two obvious ways to avoid these
dangers: one, restrict judicial campaign speech altogether and two, have a judicial
candidate take it upon herself to decline to comment on disputed legal issues
during the campaign.' 00 The former is unconstitutional 101 and for the reasons
96 Schotland, Politicians, supra note 72, at 8 n.7.
97 It is interesting to note, however, that contrary to what one might assume, the first
judicial elections since Republican Party of Minnesota were the most part "toned down" from
the 2000 elections. Elizabeth Amon, Kinder, Gentler Judicial Races? State Campaigns are Less
Nasty, but the Cost Remains High, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REv., November 4, 2002, at A9. This
may be attributable to the fact that '"[i]t takes a while for something like [the Court's decision]
to work its way into campaign practices."' Id. (quoting ABA President Alfred P. Carlton Jr.).
98 In accordance with the commentary to the 1990 ABA Code, we have to assume that
the commit clause allows some statements that would have been impermissible under the
announce clause. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (noting that the commit clause
"replaces the broad prohibition against a candidate's announcing the candidate's views on
disputed legal or political issues with the narrower one against making statements that appear
improperly to commit the candidate with respect to matters likely to come before the
candidate's court"). Logically, because it is less restrictive than its predecessor, the commit
clause permits more speech than that which would have been permissible under the announce
clause.
99 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
100 Cf Baran, supra note 9, at 14 (suggesting that even if a judicial candidate has the
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previously discussed, judicial candidates will not always be so restrained to
choose the latter. Thus, recusal has been suggested as an alternative approach
with which to protect due process and the appearance of impartiality if an issue
about which a judge has announced her views during a campaign comes before
the court.10 2 Whether recusal is required in such a situation, however, is subject to
debate.
IV. HISTORY AND RATIONALE BEHIND JUDICIAL RECUSAL
To understand why a judge may on occasion be disqualified from presiding
over a particular case, one must understand that judicial "[i]mpartiality, although a
difficult goal to achieve with perfection, must be relentlessly pursued in order to
insure the rendering of fair, just determinations and to enhance public confidence
in the judiciary."'10 3 Indeed, that judges should perform their duties impartially
and without bias is a fundamental principle of our legal system.' 0 4 This lofty goal,
however, may sometimes be difficult to apply practically. After all, judges are
human beings. They do not live in "ivory towers," isolated from the world and all
human contact. 105 They have families, friends, professional acquaintances, and
opinions about the law. Of course, most judges genuinely believe that they can
put aside all biases and act impartially. 10 6 Nevertheless, even if well-meaning, a
judge with some interest in the outcome of a case before her may have her
thought processes unconsciously swayed by that interest more than she would
freedom to announce her views on an issue, when asked about that view, she should consider
responding that she does not believe it would be appropriate to comment).
101 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
102 Schotland, Politicians, supra note 72, at 11.
103 In re Del Rio, 256 N.W.2d 727, 748 (Mich. 1977); See, e.g., Pau v. Yosemite Park &
Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that "[ljitigants are entitled to ajudge who
is detached, fair, and impartial"); United States v. Carmichael, 726 F.2d 158, 160 (4th Cir.
1984) (noting that "[e]very litigant is entitled to be heard by an impartial judge"); In re
Mussman, 302 A.2d 822, 824 (N.H. 1973) (noting that all litigants have the right to have their
cases heard 'by judges as impartial as the lot of humanity will admit.'(citation omitted)).
104 JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHIcs 100 (1st ed. 1990); See,
e.g., FLAMM, supra note 15, at 15 ("Indeed, judicial impartiality has often been considered the
sine qua non of the American legal system."); Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("One of the very objects of law is the impartiality of its
judges in fact and appearance."); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 167 (3rd
Cir. 1993); Brown v. Doe, 803 F. Supp. 932,945 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
105 SHAMAN, supra note 104, at 100; Cf FLAMM, supra note 15, at 15-16 ("[IWt is
becomingly increasingly common ... to suggest that the concept of absolute judicial
impartiality may be a legal fiction."); Edward G. Burg, Comment, Meeting the Challenge:
Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1445, 1485 (1981) (noting that as long as
we rely on humans to resolve legal disputes, absolute impartiality will only be an ideal).
106 SHAMAN, supra note 104, at 100.
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realize. 107 Thus, judges who are not truly detached from a case may need to
recuse themselves from presiding over it.
At common law, recusal for judicial bias or prejudice regarding a party was
not permitted. 10 8 According to Blackstone, "'the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already swom to administer
impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and
idea." ' 10 9 More recently, however, the law has generally viewed recusal more
favorably. 10 In 1792, Congress passed a statute requiring federal district judges
to recuse themselves whenever they had an interest in the suit before them or had
served as counsel to a party in the suit. 11I The grounds for recusal were expanded
in 1821 to cover any judicial relationship or connection with a party that the judge
felt would make it improper to preside over the case.11 2 It was not until 1911,
however, that Congress passed a statute requiring district judges to recuse
themselves for bias in general." 13
The modem view of judicial disqualification is exemplified by Canon 3E(1)
of the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.114 The Canon states that as a
general matter, "a judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned," and then lists
four specific instances in which a judge must recuse herself.115 Although the
107 Id.
108 Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986).
109 Id. (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 361).
110 See Aetna Life Ins., 475 U.S. at 820. In Aetna, the Supreme Court held that an
insurance company's due process rights were violated when a justice of the Alabama supreme
court did not recuse himself from sitting in a case against an insurance company. Id. at 825.
Because the justice was a plaintiff in an unrelated case against the insurance company and his
decision enhanced the chances for success of his own lawsuit, refusing to recuse himself
violated the company's due process rights. Id. at 823-24.
"I Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994). The federal government has
adopted the ABA standard for judicial recusal, codifying much of it verbatim in 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 (2000). SHAMAN, supra note 104, at 103. Although federal judges are not subject to
election, the practice of the federal court system is discussed here as a general standard used by
courts around the nation.
112 Liteky, 510 U.S. at 544.
113 Id.
114 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) (1990); cf SHAMAN, supra note
103, at 101 (stating the same regarding Canon 3C of the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct,
which was moved to Canon 3E(l) in the 1990 Code).
115 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1990). It should be noted that as
part of the August 2003 amendments to the Model Code, the ABA made an addition to the
general standard for recusal in Canon 3E(1). MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3(E)(1) (2003). Under the new version of the general standard, a judge must recuse herself in
instances where "the judge, while a candidate for judicial office has made a public statement
that commits, or appears to commit the judge concerning an issue or controversy in the
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drafters of the enumerated specific standards for recusal felt that they would cover
most situations, they made it clear that "the general standard should not be
overlooked."1 6 The test for determining when this general standard applies is an
proceeding." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l)(f) (2003). This new section
recognizes that there exists an unresolved relationship between judicial campaign speech and
recusal. In fact, it "is designed to make the disqualification ramifications of prohibited speech
violations explicit." See Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 24, at 11. It would not,
however, be applicable to a situation where issues are presently before a judge about which she
previously announced her views during her campaign, because merely announcing one's views
is now protected speech after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and this new subsection
requires recusal only when the judge has violated the commit clause, thus engaging in
prohibited campaign speech.
Under the enumerated specific instances for recusal, judges must recuse themselves where:
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom the
judge previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer conceming the
matter, or the judge has been a material witness concerning it;
(c) the judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the judge's spouse,
parent or child wherever residing, or any other member of the judge's family residing in
the judge's household, has an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding or has any other more than de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding;
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director or trustee of a party;
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) is known by the judge to have more than de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding;
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1) (1990); see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2000).
Subsection (a) would not apply to a candidate who has previously announced her views on a
legal issue currently before her because it aims at prejudice concerning parties, not the issues
they are litigating. For a discussion of why subsection (c) would not apply, see i?#a part V.A.
Thus, because none of these specific standards for recusal will likely cover an instance in which
a judge permissibly spoke on an issue now before her, during her campaign, the general
standard for recusal is the most appropriate test with which to measure the necessity of the
judge's recusal. Because it is not self-defining, however, this standard is a difficult one to apply.
See FLAMM, supra note 15, at 154.
116 SHAMAN, supra note 104, at 102 (citing E.WATNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO THE
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 60-61 (1973)). The general standard may in fact be the most
important recusal provision of all. See FLAMM, supra note 15, at 48 ("For judicial
disqualification purposes, the most significant section of the Code by far is Canon 3E [the
general standard for recusal].").
12172003]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
objective one: "whether an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the
relevant facts would entertain a significant doubt that the judge in question was
impartial."11 7 It has been suggested, however, that there is a high threshold for
when this general standard will apply." 8 Moreover, recusal will not be required
under any standard if no judge can be found who possesses the requisite amount
of impartiality. 119 The next Part will discuss whether a judge who has announced
her views on disputed legal or political issues during her campaign must
disqualify herself under the general standard for recusal because of that
announcement.
V. JUDGES WHO HAVE ENGAGED IN CAMPAIGN SPEECH PERMISSIBLE
UNDER THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT NEED NOT RECUSE THEMSELVES
FROM HEARING CASES INVOLVING ISSUES ON WHICH THEY CAMPAIGNED
After Republican Party of Minnesota, judicial candidates have more freedom
to speak on issues of interest to the electorate during a campaign. Whether or not
the remaining confusion surrounding the restrictions on judicial campaign speech
will chill candidates from invoking this freedom remains to be seen. Assuming
that judicial candidates are going to speak on issues during their campaigns in
ways that do not violate their respective state's Codes of Judicial Conduct, the
problem then arises whether they must recuse themselves, once elected, if issues
on which they spoke during their campaigns are present before them in a case.
The answer is no; judges in this situation need not recuse themselves. Because,
however, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is not entirely clear on this
point, the answer is not self-evident.
A. Due Process Concerns Do Not Mandate Recusal
In her dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota, Justice Ginsburg explained
that although judicial candidates have an interest in free speech, that interest must
117 SHAMAN, supra note 104, at 143 (citing PepsiCo, Inc. v. McMillan, 764 F.2d 458, 460
(7th Cir. 1985)).
118 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 558 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating,
"I think all would agree that a high threshold is required to satisfy [the general standard for
recusal]").
119 SHAMAN, supra note 104, at 103. This exception is known as the rule of necessity.
The rule, which has its roots in the common law, FLAMM, supra note 15, at 591 (citing Adkins
v. Tell City, 625 N.E.2d 1298, 1304 (Ind. App. 1993)), essentially states that a judge need not
recuse herself if no other judge in that jurisdiction is capable of being more impartial. FLAMM,
supra note 15, at 590. The classic example of the rule's application is a situation in which a
particular case's resolution will affect the pay or retirement benefits ofjudges as a whole. Id. at
592. Since all judges would have a similar interest in the resolution of the case, the judge need
not withdraw from presiding over it. Id.
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be reconciled with a competing interest: the due process rights of the litigants
before the judge. She explained, "[b]alanced against the candidate's interest in
free expression is the litigant's 'powerful and independent constitutional interest
in fair adjudicative procedure. '"l20 Indeed, it is hard to deny that the "foremost
duty of a legal system is dispensing due process to those who come within its
ambit."'121 According to Justice Ginsburg, an important requirement of due
process is that each litigant is entitled to a proceeding in which the judge has no
interest in a particular outcome. 122 She explained that a litigant is deprived of due
process when a judge hearing a case has a "direct, personal, substantial, and
pecuniary" interest in its outcome.123 That interest, furthermore, need not be so
direct, but rather may stem from the judge's knowledge that her success and
tenure in office are dependent upon certain outcomes in cases she hears.124
According to Justice Ginsburg, judges hearing cases involving issues upon
which they spoke during their campaigns have a sufficient interest in the outcome
such that due process is violated.125 She explained, a judge who does not hold
true to her campaign position on an issue in a case before her risks losing support
120 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 813 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243 (1980)).
121 Shepard, supra note 17, at 1099.
122 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("No man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome.")).
123 Id. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523
(1927) (holding that due process was violated when a judge received a portion of the fines
collected from defendants whom he found guilty)); see Max Minzner, Gagged but Not Bound:
The Ineffectiveness of the Rules Governing Judicial Campaign Speech, 68 UMKC L. REv. 209,
235 (1999) ("Judges who make campaign commitments certainly have a direct interest in the
outcome [of a case on that issue].").
124 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Ward v.
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972)).
125 Id. at 815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Shepard, supra note 17, at 1087 ("One would
imagine that a judge's interest in his or her job would [be a sufficiently substantial interest].");
cf Deters v. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 205 (Ky. 1994) ("Justice
can hardly be blind if the judge has made a pre-election commitment or prejudgment which
causes him or her to apply the blindfold only as to one side of an issue."); Stretton v.
Disciplinary Board, 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Taking a position in advance of
litigation would inhibit the judge's ability to consider the matter impartially."); Gillers, supra
note 32, at 726 ("A commitment to decide a particular case in a particular way is the antithesis
of the judicial process."). Whether the Supreme Court would find a due process violation in the
type of case hypothesized by Justice Ginsburg, however, is far from certain. The Court has held
that "only in the most extreme of cases would [recusal for a general bias or prejudice
concerning a particular type of litigant] be constitutionally required." Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie,
475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986); see also Shepard, supra note 17, at 1089 ("Under present rules of
conduct and due process case law, courts are reluctant to find constitutional violations even in
fairly tangible situations.").
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of those who helped get her elected.126 Thus, she will have a "direct, personal,
substantial, and pecuniary interest"'127 in ruling against certain litigants because
she may be voted off the bench and lose her salary and benefits if she does not
honor her campaign position on the issue before her-a position for which she
presumably received quite a number of votes. 128 Accordingly, if it would violate
due process for a judge to preside over cases involving issues about which she
spoke during her campaign, 129 then recusal would be the appropriate preventative
measure to safeguard the due process rights of litigants.
Before accepting that due process concerns require recusal in the proposed
situation, it must first be recognized that "[a]ll judges come on to the bench with
views about important issues, whether or not these [views] have been expressed
during the election campaign or the confirmation process."' 130 It is unrealistic to
assume they do not. Yet whether a particular judge's opinion on a legal issue is
known because of a campaign statement will depend entirely on chance. 131
Moreover, according to the Court in Republican Party of Minnesota, that a judge
has no predisposition regarding particular legal issues in a case before her "has
never been thought a necessary component of equal justice [in part because] it is
virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the
126 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg's
remarks specifically refer to the pledges clause. She explained, however, that the announce
clause serves similar interests by preventing judicial candidates from avoiding the pledges
clause through implied promises contained within the candidate's announced views. Id. at 819.
127 Id. at 814 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523) (internal alteration omitted).
128 Id at 816-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
129 In no way does this Note intend to suggest that a judge in this situation would
consciously violate the due process rights of litigants out of an improper motive. To the
contrary, this Note recognizes that "j]udges take an oath of office, and their judicial role serves
as an incredibly powerful influence over their behavior. Th[is] judicial role is to decide cases as
impartially and fairly as possible." Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 744. Nevertheless, the due
process clause "may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do
their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties." Republican
Party, 536 U.S. at 815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Aetna Life Ins., 475 U.S. at 825)
(internal quotation omitted).
130 Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 744; Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. & Removal
Comm'n, 776 F. Supp. 309, 315 (W.D. Ky. 1991) ("All candidates for elective office, including
judicial candidates, presumably come equipped with opinions and predilections which are the
result of their life experiences.").
131 Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835 (1972). According to Justice Rehnquist, such a
random circumstance by itself is not enough to form a basis for disqualification of a federal
judge. Id. at 836. In Laird, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist declined to recuse himself from a
case involving an issue about which he had expressed an opinion prior to coming to the bench.
Id. at 836-37. Of course, federal judges are not subject to election, so similar popular pressures
may not apply to his argument in the context of an elected judge.
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law.",132
Thus, a key question regarding the due process rights of litigants is whether a
judge is more likely to rule in accordance with the views she expressed during her
campaign. 133 If the judge would act the same whether or not during her campaign
she expressed views on an issue in the case presently before her, then the
expression of those views does not make her less impartial 134 and recusal would
not be required in order to avoid violating due process. In reality, we can only
speculate if the judicial candidate's expression of views during the campaign
makes her less impartial. If elected, however, the judge will most likely do the
same thing regardless of whether or not she expressed her opinions on the issues
before her during a campaign.135 This is so in part because all elected judges once
on the bench will feel similar pressure to reach politically popular decisions in
order to be reelected, regardless of whether they have made campaign
announcements on issues before them. Indeed, a judge concerned with reelection
who "is trying, consciously or unconsciously, to please the voters will take the
politically popular approach, whether or not it was expressed previously."'' 36
Thus, a campaign announcement will have little practical effect on a judge's
ability to render due process to litigants before her if she does not recuse herself.
B. The Judiciary's Need to Maintain the Appearance of Impartiality Does
Not Mandate Recusal
The general recusal standard in Canon 3E(l) requires a judge to recuse
herself when her impartiality may reasonably be questioned. 37 This does not
necessarily mean her impartiality is actually compromised, but rather that it
appears to be.138 Accordingly, even if the due process clause does not command
132 Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 777; see also FLAMM, supra note 15, at 295 (stating
that because it is extremely difficult to find a judge who judges without views on the law or
public policy, if judges were always disqualified from hearing cases because of those views
"our judicial system would likely grind to a halt.").
133 Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 744. It is important to remember that at least for bias
concerning a particular type of litigant, recusal will be required only in the most extreme cases.
Aetna Life Ins., 475 U.S. at 821. Even in fairly tangible situations, rarely do courts find due
process to be violated by ajudge's refusal to recuse herself. Shepard, supra note 17, at 1089. In
the situation presently discussed, a judge's potential bias is premised on the notion that a judge
might fear being voted out of office if she does not adhere to views she announced during her
campaign. Such a situation does not appear to be extreme and is certainly not very tangible, but
rather relies on at least some degree of speculation.
134 See Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 744.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l) (1990).
138 FLAMM, supra note 15, at 48.
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recusal of a judge who, during her campaign spoke on issues currently before her,
the desire for judges to maintain the appearance of impartiality might.
The need for the judiciary to appear impartial is either as important as actual
impartiality "or at least a close second."' 39 The judiciary, "[p]ossessed of neither
the purse nor the sword, it depends primarily on the willingness of members of
society to follow its mandates."' 140 The authority of the judiciary, therefore, relies
upon public faith in the integrity of judges. A widespread belief that the courts are
not impartial-resulting in a loss of public faith in the legal system and thus an
unwillingness to respect its authority-would destroy the judiciary as quickly as
an actual lack of impartiality would,' 4' perhaps quicker. Thus, unless we want
people to choose less acceptable means of resolving their own disputes, the public
and individual litigants must be reassured that the judiciary will decide legal
disputes based on the law alone. 142
The lone case to uphold an announce clause during the 1990s-the Third
139 Gillers, supra note 32, at 729; cf In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (noting
that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice") (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S.
11, 14 (1954)); FLAMM, supra note 15, at 148 (noting the need for a judicial system in which
the public has unwavering confidence); State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 695
(Mo. App. 1990) (noting the importance of a legal system that is not only fair but also appears
to be fair). Canon 2A of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct underscores the importance of the
appearance of impartiality in the judiciary. It provides that at all times a judge shall act "in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary."
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (1990). Moreover, the August 2003
Amendments to the Model Code included an addition to the commentary of Canon 2A, which
provided that the speech restrictions placed upon judges and judicial candidates are
"indispensable to the maintenance of the integrity, impartiality, and independence of the
judiciary." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A cmt. (2003). Nevertheless, for the
reasons discussed in this Part, because it does not endanger the appearance of impartiality for a
judge to preside over a case involving issues on which she announced her views during her
campaign, Canon 2A seems presently inapplicable.
140 Irving R. Kaufinan, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial Ethics, 35
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 5 (1970).
141 Shepard, supra note 17, at 1059; FLAMM, supra note 15, at 148 ("Allegations of
judicial bias may serve to erode.., public confidence [in the judiciary]."); State v. Gardner, 789
P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989) ("Nothing is more damaging to the public confidence in the legal
system than the appearance of bias or prejudice on the part of the judge."). In fact, the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that violations of the Code could diminish public
confidence in the judiciary, thereby damaging the system of government under law. See MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 cmt. (1990).
142 Dep't of Revenue v. Golder, 322 So. 2d 1, 2, 7 (Fla. 1975) (although he had no actual
bias, a Florida supreme court Justice recused himself, on reconsideration, from hearing a case
regarding an estate tax-the constitutionality of which he expressed an opinion on as Special
Tax Counsel to the Florida House of Representatives prior to coming to the bench-in order to
prevent public concern for the integrity of the court's decision). But see Laird v. Tatum, 409
U.S. 824, 835 (1972) (then-Associate Justice Rehnquist did not recuse himself on account of
the expression of his views-prior to coming onto the bench-on an issue before the Court).
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Circuit decision in Stretton-recognized that allowing judges to preside over
cases regarding issues on which they made campaign announcements could
damage the appearance of impartiality in the courts. 143 Even if the judge did not
feel pressure to reach a particular outcome, according to the court, the campaign
announcement would leave the impression that the case was prejudged rather than
properly and impartially adjudicated. 144 If judges are allowed to make such
prejudgments, "the concept of impartial justice becomes a mockery,"' 145 and
thus-whether its fears are well-founded or not-the public will lose faith in the
impartiality of the courts. 146
Accordingly, one could argue that judges should be required to recuse
themselves if cases involving issues on which they spoke during the campaign
come before them. Requiring recusal in such cases would not only prevent judges
from feeling pressure to ensure that certain legal outcomes occur in order to get
reelected, but would also help maintain public faith in the judiciary.
It is not at all clear, however, that a judge's mere statement of her views is
143 Stretton v. Disciplinary Board, 944 F.2d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 1991).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 142.
146 See id Another aspect of judicial elections besides judicial candidate speech
undoubtedly affects the appearance of impartiality in the courts. "[T]he mere possibility that
judges' decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contributors is likely to
undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary." Republican Party of Minn. v. White 536
U.S. 765, 790 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see, e.g., Amon, supra note 97, at A9 (quoting
Geri Palast, Executive Director of Justice at Stake) ("A large number of Americans are
concerned that money and special interests affect the outcome of court verdicts and that
undermines the faith in justice."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary:
The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHi.-KENT L. REV.
133, 138 (1998) ("There is a grave risk that a judge will be more favorably disposed to those
who gave or spent money .... At the very least, the appearance of impropriety is inevitable;
litigants and the public will perceive that decisions were influenced by money."); Elizabeth A.
Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and Popular Democracy, 79 DENV.
U. L. REv. 65, 78 (2001) ("Elections create concerns about judicial corruption and impartiality.
The view is that current elections and campaign financing create an impression of impropriety,
bringing into question a judge's ability to impartially interpret and apply laws and administer
justice.") (internal citation omitted); Kurt M. Brauer, The Role of Campaign Fundraising in
Michigan's Supreme Court Elections: Should We Throw the Baby Out With the Bathwater?, 44
WAYNE L. REv. 367, 374 (1998) (noting that there is a debate whether campaign fundraising
calls into question the impartiality of elected judges). Indeed, the impact of fundraising on
judicial elections can not be understated. In the 2000 election cycle, state supreme court
candidates raised over $45.6 million, a 61% increase from the 1998 elections, with the average
candidate raising $430,529. Deborah Goldberg & Craig Holman, The New Politics of Judicial
Elections, at http://faircourts.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf. Thus, because of the potentially
corrupting effects of money on judicial campaigns, even prohibiting judicial candidates from
engaging in campaign speech altogether will not, by itself, preserve the appearance of
impartiality thereby ensuring public faith in the courts.
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enough to destroy the appearance of impartiality in a given case--even if the
judge's likely decision is well-known because of that expression. 147 None could
credibly argue that Justice Scalia should recuse himself from hearing abortion
cases because of a lack of the appearance of impartiality, even though it is almost
certain with which side he will vote. 148 Furthermore, in part because the ABA
Code recognizes "the necessity and value of judges' having fixed beliefs about
constitutional principles and many other facets of the law,"149 judges are
specifically encouraged to "speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other
extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of
justice and non-legal subjects."' 150 It would therefore be strange, if not
inconsistent, for a judge to be required to recuse herself simply because during her
campaign she announced her views on legal issues that happen to now be present
in a case before her, but not because she did so in pre or post-campaign discussion
of the law.
More importantly, the existing restrictions placed upon judicial candidates by
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct already serve to protect against
campaign speech hazardous to the appearance of impartiality-while at the same
time recognizing that candidates have a First Amendment right to advocate their
own election by discussing legal issues.151 The very reason the canons filter out
pledges of conduct in office and statements that commit judicial candidates with
respect to legal issues is that such statements make the prospective judge appear
less impartial. 152 Logically, one can therefore presume that statements by a
147 Compare Laird, 409 U.S. at 835 (Associate Justice of the Supreme Court declined to
recuse himself from a case involving an issue about which he had expressed an opinion prior to
coming to the bench), with Harriet, 322 So. 2d. at 1 (Florida Supreme Court Justice recused
himself from hearing a case regarding an issue about which he expressed an opinion prior to
coming to the bench).
148 See Chemerinsky, supra note 9, at 745.
149 THODE, supra note 116, at 61.
150 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B. (1990). The commentary to the
canon explains that since judges are specially learned in the law, they are in a unique position to
contribute to its improvement, and thus are encouraged to participate in discourse about the law.
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B cmt. (1990). It cautions, however, that the
freedom to participate in extra-judicial legal activities remains subject to the requirements of the
Code. Id. One such requirement may be Canon 2A, which provides a possible basis for
disciplining a judge as a result of engaging in extra-judicial legal activities that undermine
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. See MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (1990).
151 See THODE, supra note 116, at 96 (explaining that Canon 7 of the 1972 Code-now
Canon 5 of the 1990 Code--"compromises between political reality and the aim of maintaining
the appearance ofjudicial impartiality").
152 See id. This purpose is further evident from Canon 30 of the original 1924 Canons, in
which judicial candidates were admonished to "do nothing while a candidate to create the
impression that if chosen, he will administer his office with bias, partiality or improper
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judicial candidate not prohibited by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct-for
instance announcing one's views on disputed legal issues-are not likely to
destroy the appearance of impartiality.
C. Recusal is Not Required for a Judge Who Made Campaign Statements
Involving Issues Currently Before Her
Although there are legitimate concerns about the due process rights of
litigants and the appearance of impartiality of the judiciary, that a judicial
candidate expresses her views about disputed legal or political issues during her
campaign should not require her recusal if those issues come before her as
judge.' 53 The appearance of impartiality is already protected by existing
restrictions on judicial candidate speech and should require recusal only if the
judge's views came to light during her campaign, but not, for example if they are
known because she has written extensively on a given topic. Nor should due
process concerns require her recusal, because any bias the judge might have as a
result of reelection concerns creates an incentive to render a politically popular
decision, not one that accords with her previous views. Moreover, because all
judges come to the bench with views about the law-whether or not they have
been publicly expressed-and will all have similar concerns about reelection,
solely because a judicial candidate expresses her views during the campaign does
not make her any more or less predisposed to reach a certain conclusion of law
than any other judge.
VI. PROPOSAL TO THE ABA TO IMPROVE CLARITY REGARDING WHETHER
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN SPEECH REQUIRES REcusAL
Because it is not entirely clear that a judge who previously made general
campaign statements about an issue currently before her need not recuse herself,
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct should be amended in order to provide
guidance to judges that may now face such a situation after Republican Party of
Minnesota. The answer to this recusal dilemma is unclear because of the
inevitable tension between the free speech rights of judicial candidates and the
discrimination." CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924). It is clear from this directive
that the restrictions on judicial candidate speech are intended to preserve the appearance of
impartiality.
153 But see Missouri Supreme Court, Order, Re: Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon
5B(1)(c) Campaign Conduct (July 18, 2002), available at http://www.osca.state.mo.us/sup
/index.nsf (holding that in light of the decision in Republican Party of Minnesota, Missouri's
announce clause would not be enforced, but noting without explanation that "[r]ecusal, or other
remedial action, may nonetheless be required of any judge in cases that involve an issue about
which the judge has announced his or her views as otherwise may be appropriate under
Missouri's Code of Judicial Conduct").
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due process rights of litigants coupled with the judiciary's need to appear
impartial-a tension that remains unresolved by the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct. Indeed, that the ABA felt it necessary to amend Canon 3E(1) of the
Model Code in August 2003 in order to make explicit that recusal is required of a
judge who has engaged in prohibited campaign speech on an issue currently
before her is evidence that there exists an unexplained relationship between
judicial campaign speech and recusal.154
On one hand, Canon 4B encourages judges to engage in extra-judicial
discourse about the law and-although written in prohibitive terms-judicial
candidates are now allowed under Canon 5A(3)(d) to announce their views on
legal issues. 5 5 On the other hand, the Code generally stresses the importance of
judicial impartiality, and the general standard for recusal contained in Canon
3E(1) instructs a judge to disqualify herself from any case in which her
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. A potential conflict arises then
because a judicial candidate's exercise of her free speech rights during her
campaign might cause her impartiality to be reasonably questioned once on the
bench, thereby requiring recusal in a given case under the general standard in
Canon 3E(1). For reasons previously discussed, however, recusal is not
required. 156 Yet, because the relationship between the general standard for recusal
under Canon 3E(1) and the speech restrictions on judicial candidates contained in
Canon 5A(3)(d) remains not fully explained by the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, this is not self-evident.
A simple addition to the Code would alleviate any confusion as to whether a
judge must recuse herself under the general standard in Canon 3E(1) as a result of
making permissible campaign statements. The addition should be to the
commentary of Canon 3E(l), 157 which contains the general standard for recusal
and-after the August 2003 amendments-the admonition that recusal is required
as a result of prohibited campaign speech, and should provide as follows: "The
existing restrictions on judicial campaign speech safeguard against campaign
speech that risks undermining the appearance of impartiality in the courts. Thus,
campaign statements that do not violate this canon are, by themselves,
presumably insufficient to require recusal under the standard set forth in Canon
3E(1) of this Code."'158 This addition would clarify that while the Code's judicial
154 See supra note 115. What the August 2003 amendments neglected to address,
however, is the relationship between recusal and judicial campaign speech that is now
permissible after Republican Party of Minnesota. The proposal contained in this Part seeks to
address that yet-unexplained relationship.
155 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (2003).
156 See supra Part V.C.
157 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(l) (2003).
158 Accordingly, since merely announcing one's views on the law during a campaign
does not violate the provisions of Canon 5A(3)(d), such statements are not sufficient grounds
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campaign speech restrictions permit judicial candidates to exercise their free
speech rights, they also prevent speech that undermines the appearance of
impartiality in the judiciary itself. If a judicial candidate's statements are not
prohibited by the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, then they are likely not
enough to endanger the appearance of impartiality in the courts. By adding a
small amount of commentary, this notion can be articulated and confusion
regarding exactly what the Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires of judicial
candidates can be easily avoided.
VII. CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota,
judicial candidates-regardless of whether or not one thinks they should do so-
are free to say more about their views on the law than has been previously
permitted in many states. It is not clear, however, what should happen when a
case comes before a judge involving issues on which she spoke during her
campaign. Perhaps she should recuse herself to protect the due process rights of
the litigants before her and preserve the appearance of impartiality of the court. Or
perhaps she need not because due process is no more affected in this situation
than any other situation involving an elected judge and because the appearance of
impartiality is already safeguarded by remaining restrictions on judicial candidate
speech. Although the correct answer is the latter, this is not expressed clearly
enough in the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct. In
order to clarify its position regarding whether judges in this situation should
recuse themselves, the drafters of the ABA Code must provide the legal
community with an explanation of the relationship between the restrictions on
judicial campaign speech and the general standard for recusal.
for a judge's impartiality to be reasonably questioned in accordance with the proposed addition
and thus do not require recusal under the general standard in Canon 3E(1).
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